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Abstract
This study applies cross-section data to the estimation of a
simultaneous model of leisure and saving behavior. Estimates
of the parameters of a two-period CES utility function are used
to derive compensated and uncompensated wage and interest rate
elasticity estimates. The study finds that while saving and
leisure are nonresponsive to changes in the interest rate, they
are highly responsive to changes in the wage rate. It follows
that the taxation of wage income creates large deadweight
losses while the taxation of interest income has little
distortionary effect on behavior. This has important
implications for the taxation of wages and interest.
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TAXATION, SAVING, AND LABOR SUPPLY: CROSS-SECTION EVIDENCE
In analyzing the effect of taxation on saving and labor
supply, most studies neglect the interrelationship between work
and saving. It is generally assumed that labor supply is
independent of the interest rate and saving is independent of
the wage rate. Neglecting the cross-substitution possibilities
between work and saving can lead to erroneous conclusions
regarding the effect of taxation. One purpose of the present
study is to develop an analytical framework which views the
work and saving decisions as part of a simultaneous decision
problem.
A second objective of the present study is to apply cross-
section data to the study of the work and saving decisions. It
has long been common to analyze the effect of taxation on labor
supply using cross-section data since several good sources of
household data containing information on hours worked, wage
rate, and income are available. However, household data sets
typically lack information on saving and interest rates. As a
consequence, studies of taxation and saving routinely rely on
aggregate time series data.
The present study uses the 1986 Panel Study of Income
Dynamics which applies to the 1984 interviewing year. Saving
is inferred as a residual between family income and various
consumption items such as taxes, mortgage payments, rent, and
food. The interest rate is imputed on the basis of state of
residence. The compensated wage and interest elasticities are
calculated based on utility parameter estimates derived from a
generalized least squares estimation of a leisure/saving model.
The model and its estimation are described in section I, the
econometric results are presented in sections II and III, and
their implications are explored in section IV. Conclusions are
contained in section V.
I. The Model and Its Estimation
A. The Theoretical Assumptions
The model of this study is a simple two-period life cycle
model. The individual is assumed to choose among consumption,
saving, and leisure during the first (or working) period and to
consume the savings principal plus interest during the second
(or retirement) period. The tax system influences the decision
in several ways: by reducing the net wage rate, by reducing
the net non-wage income of the individual, and by reducing the
net interest rate. The individual's problem is to choose
leisure and saving during the first period so as to maximize a
utility function defined over first-period consumption, Ci,
first-period leisure, L^, and second-period consumption, C2r
subject to first-and second-period budget constraints.
)\
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Assuming the utility function takes the constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) form, the problem is one of
maximizing:
(1) U = [aiCi-b + a2Li-b + (l-ai-a2)C2"^]~^/^
(where ai and a2 are positive constants less than one and b is
a constant greater than minus one) subject to the following
budget constraints:
(2a) Ci = w(k-Li) + A - S
(2b) C2 = (l+r)S
(where the wage rate, w, non-wage income. A, and the interest
rate, r, are measured net of taxes, k is the total time
available, and S is saving). When the constant b is equal to
zero, the utility function becomes Cobb-Douglas.
The first order conditions to this maximization problem
may be found by differentiating (1) with respect to Li and S
subject to (2a) and (2b). After rearranging, these may be
written as:
-s ,.-s(3a) Li = Ml =* w ^ Ci
(3b) S = M2 ^ (l+r)2~^ Ci
where M^ = ai/a2f M2 = ai/(l-ai-a2) / and s = l/(l+b).
B. The Estimation Model
The theoretical model described in the previous subsection
can be put in estimation form by dividing through equations
(3a) and (3b) by Ci and taking logs:
(4a) ln(Li/Ci) = -s In Ml - s In w + ei
(4b) ln(S/Ci) = -s In M2 + (s-1) In (1+r) + 62
where e^ and e2 are disturbance terms introduced to capture
omitted explanatory influences. Since s, the elasticity of
substitution, is always positive, the model states that the
leisure-consumption ratio is negatively related to the wage
rate (i.e., people with higher wage rates have lower leisure-
consumption shares). However, since s may be either greater
than or less than one, the relationship between the saving-
consumption share and the interest rate is indeterminate.
The ordinary least squares estimation of equations (4a)
and (4b) on a cross-section sample of individuals would be
inappropriate for two reasons. First, the slope of equation
(4a) is equal to -s while the slope of equation (4b) is equal
to (s-1) requiring that the sum of the two slopes equals minus
7one. This constraint across equations must be taken into
account in the estimation. Second, possible correlation
between the two error terms, e^ and e2f arising from the
omission of variables or from heteroskedasticity must be
accounted for. As described in the next section, this will be
accomplished by using constrained generalized least squares as
the estimation technique.
The constrained estimates of the intercept and slope
coefficients of equations (4a) and (4b) can be used to derive
estimates of the utility parameters b, ai, and a2. In
particular, using the definitions of M^, M2^ and s, yields the
following formulas for the utility parameters:
(5a) b = (l-s)/s
(5b) ai = MiM2/(Mi + M2 + M1M2
)
(5c) a2 = M2/(Mi + M2 + M1M2
)
which, as shown in the next section, can be used to indirectly
estimate the compensated wage and interest elasticities.
C. The Uncompensated and Compensated Elasticities
The next step is to solve equations (3a) and (3b) for L^
and S independently of each other. This is done by
8substituting for Ci from equation (2a) and simplifying. The
result is:
(6a) Li = Mi~^w~2(wk + A)/D
(6b) S = M2"^(l+r)^"^(wk + A)/D
where D = 1 + Mi'^w^"^ + M2"^( 1+r )2"'^.
The uncompensated wage and interest elasticities can be
derived from equations (6a) and (6b) by differentiating the
equations by w and r,- respectively, and applying the standard
elasticity definitions. This gives:
(7a) eLw = -s + (wk/(wk + A) ) - ((l-s)Mi ^vf^-^/D)
(7b) esr = -(l-s)r(l + Mi 2w^~^)/(l+r )D
It can be seen that the uncompensated wage and interest
elasticities depend on the wage and interest rates, on non-work
income, and on the parameters of the utility function.
The compensated elasticities follow directly by accounting
for the income effect:
(8a) eLw^OMP = ^^^ _ (w(k-Li)/Li) OLi/8 A)
(8b) esr^^^^ = esr " ( r/( 1+r ) ) ( aS/3A)
IAfter substitution and simplification, this yields
(9a) eLw^OMP = g^^ _ (wk/(wk+A)) + (Mi ^w^ ^/D)
(9b) esr^°^^ = esr " ( rM2 S(l+r)S l/(l+r)D)
Both sets of wage and interest elasticities can be calculated
for each household from the estimates of s, M^, and M2 and from
the known values of w. A, and r. Maximum time available, k, is
set at 8,760 (24 hours per day times 365 days per year).
D. The Data and Estimation Technique
Data are from the 1986 Michigan Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) for the 1984 interviewing year. Unmarried
persons, the self-employed, families on welfare or social
security, families with head of household over 60 or under 20
years of age, and families with an unemployed head of household
are excluded from the estimation sample. This provides for a
subsample of households whose decisions are least likely to be
distorted by education or retirement decisions, households for
which wage rate data are available, and households whose
work/saving decisions are not biased by high implicit marginal
tax rates (as with AFDC recipients, say). The estimation
subsample includes 1,675 households.
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Saving is defined as a residual between total family
income and major consumption items. The consumption items
available for exclusion are total federal income taxes, the
family's annual mortgage payment, annual property tax for
homeowning families, annual rent for renting families, and
annual food expenditures at home and away from home. Hence,
most tax, shelter, and food costs are netted out of income to
arrive at a proxy for saving. Other items of consumption such
as transportation, entertainment, and clothing are not
available in the data for exclusion. There is no way of
knowing to what extent this may bias the estimation results.
The interest rate is imputed to each family on the basis
of their state of residence. The interest rate used is the
median rate on time and savings deposits paid by banks in the
family's state. The rate is a composite rate on total time and
savings deposits calculated by dividing interest paid on
deposits by average interest bearing deposits.
Variables are put on an after tax basis by multiplying by
one minus the family's marginal tax rate. The marginal tax
rate is imputed for each family in the sample based on the
family's taxable income, number of exemptions, and the tax
table used. Taxpayers are either assigned the standard
deduction (zero-bracket amount) or an average itemized
deduction for their taxable income bracket depending on whether
or not the family itemizes deductions. For those families
itemizing deductions, the amount of the itemized deduction is
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calculated by applying an average fraction of income determined
from the 1982 Statistics of Income — Individual Tax Returns to
the family's taxable income. The deduction for married couples
when both work is calculated by subtracting from gross income
10% of the earned income of the lesser-earning spouse
regardless of whether the couple itemizes or not.
Equations (4a) and (4b) are estimated using joint
generalized least squares taking account of the restraint
across equations. The maximum likelihood technique uses
estimates of the covariance across residuals to increase the
efficiency of estimation. The results of the estimation are
described in the Inext section.
II. Econometric Results
A. Estimation Results
The generalized least squares estimation results for
equations (4a) and (4b) are shown in Table 1. The dependent
variables, the log of the leisure-consumption ratio and the log
of the saving-consumption ratio, are related to the explanatory
variables, the log of the wage rate and the log of one plus the
interest rate, taking account of possible correlation between
the two error terms and a cross-equation constraint on the
slope coefficients. As seen in Table 1, the estimated slopes
12
Table 1
Generalized Least Squares Estimation Results
For the Leisure Saving Model
(t-ratios in parenthesis)
Equation 4a Equation 4b
Dependent variable ln(Li/Ci) ln(S/Ci)
Explanatory variables:
Intercept 1.010 0.496
(22.22) (36.61)
In w -0.821
(34.49)
In (1+r) ~ -0.179
(-7.51)
System Weighted R-Square: 0.264
Utility parameters:
b .218
ai .150
a2 .574
s .821
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are of the expected signs and meet the constraint that they sum
to minus one. All of the estimated coefficients are
significantly different from zero at the .99 level of
significance and the system weighted R-squared statistic
suggests a reasonably good fit for cross-section data.
The implied utility function parameters are shown at the
bottom of Table 1. The substitution parameter, b, whose
estimated value is .218, can range between -1 and infinity. If
b is equal to zero, the CES utility function reduces to the
Cobb-Douglas form. The parameter is used to calculate the
elasticity of substitution defined as l/(l+b). Its value of
.821 greater than zero suggests a relationship of
substitutability among present consumption, leisure, and future
consumption.
B. Elasticity Results
The wage and interest elasticities measure the
responsiveness of leisure and saving to one percent changes in
the wage and interest rates, respectively. The uncompensated
elasticities reflect the operation of both the income and
substitution effects while the compensated elasticities control
for changes in income. The uncompensated elasticities,
calculated according to equations (7a) and (7b), and the
compensated elasticities calculated according to equations (9a)
and (9b), are shown in Table 2.
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Table 2
Wage and Interest Elasticities
Uncompensated Elasticities:
SLw --027
egr -.008
Compensated Elasticities:
eLw^OMP ..306
esr'^O"^ -.022
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The estimated uncompensated wage elasticity, bl^^, is
negative and small. Theory does not tell us the expected sign
of this coefficient since it is the result of a substitution
effect adverse to leisure and an income effect favorable to
leisure. The fact that its estimated value is small and
negative tells us that the substitution effect slightly
overpowers the income
effect.
For policy analysis, the compensated wage elasticity is a
more meaningful concept than the uncompensated elasticity since
the compensated elasticity indicates what would happen to
leisure with a change in the wage rate if income were changed
so as to hold utility constant. Its estimated value, -.306, is
moderately large and negative, implying, for example, that a
ten percent increase in the wage rate compensated by a decrease
in income so as to hold utility constant would result in a 3.06
percent decrease in the consumption of leisure.
The estimated value of the uncompensated interest rate
elasticity, eg^, is likewise small and negative. An increase
in the interest rate causes a small decrease in saving. Even
though this result seems counter-intuitive, in fact it is
consistent with theory since an increase in the interest rate
has an indeterminate effect on present consumption and on
leisure. Depending
.
on the effect of the interest rate on
present consumption and leisure, an increase in the interest
rate may increase or decrease saving.
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Again, for policy purposes, it is the compensated interest
rate elasticity that is of greatest interest. Its estimated
value is negative but very small. According to the estimation
results, a ten percent increase in the interest rate leads to a
.22 percent decrease in saving when income is changed so as to
hold utility constant. A comparison of these results with
those of the literature is presented in the next section.
C. Comparison with the Results of Other Studies
C.l Wage Elasticities
Since wage elasticities in the literature are most often
reported in terms of work rather than leisure, it is first
necessary to convert the leisure-wage elasticities reported in
Table 2 into work-wage elasticities. Since work and leisure
are related by H^ = k - L^, it follows that the uncompensated
and compensated wage elasticities are related as follows:
(10a) enw = - eLw Ll/Hi
(10b) enw^^^^ = - eLw^OWP l^/Hi
With appropriate substitutions, the results of this study
suggest that the uncompensated work-wage elasticity is .079 and
the compensated work-wage elasticity is .910.
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The early econometric studies of the labor supply of prime
age males found slightly backward bending labor supply curves
as would be implied by small, negative work-wage elasticities.
For example, Ashenfelter and Heckman (1973) who used 1967 data
on male heads of families found a work-wage elasticity of -.150
and a compensated work-wage elasticity of .120. More recent
studies which are more sophisticated in their treatment of
income taxation tend to find larger compensated work-wage
elasticities.
Hausman (1981), using 1975 data from the Michigan Survey
of Income Dynamics, an older version of the data set used in
this study, found an uncompensated work-wage elasticity close
to zero and a moderately large compensated work-wage elasticity
of .17. Other recent studies, as summarized by Hausman (1985),
report uncompensated work-wage elasticities ranging from -.13
to .09 and compensated work-wage elasticities ranging from -.08
to .20.
The uncompensated work-wage elasticity estimated in this
study (.079) is within the range of these recent labor supply
studies. However, the compensated work-wage elasticity
estimated here (.910) is considerably larger than compensated
work-wage elasticities found by other studies.
C.2 Interest Rate Elasticities
In one of the earliest studies of the saving-interest rate
relationship, Wright (1967) obtained estimates of the
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compensated saving-interest elasticity of 0.18 to 0.27. In
contrast, a later study by Blinder (1975) found compensated
saving elasticities near zero, while Boskin (1978) estimated
saving elasticities in the range 0.30 to 0.60 with a preferred
value of 0.40. However, it is not clear from the specification
that Boskin's estimated elasticities are compensated
elasticities.^
Boskin's results have generated a great deal of
controversy. Since he used time series data, it was necessary
to correct the market rate of return for inflation. This
requires measuring the expected inflation rate, which Boskin
calculated as a weighted average of past inflation rates. In a
recent study. Blinder and Deaton (1985) used an alternative
method for computing the expected inflation rate and found that
the net real rate of interest has little impact on saving.
The results of this study also suggest that changes in the
rate of interest have little effect on saving. Both the
estimated uncompensated interest rate elasticity (-.008) and
the estimated compensated interest rate elasticity (-.022) are
very close to zero.
III. Cross-Effects
A major difference between the present study and earlier
studies is that earlier studies assume away cross-effects while
the present study incorporates them. Hence, the present
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estimation can be used to measure the effect of changes in the
interest rate on leisure and of changes in the wage rate on
saving.
Following the earlier methodology for calculating the own
wage and interest elasticities, differentiate equation (6a) by
r and (6b) by w, and apply the standard cross-elasticity
definition. This gives:
(lla) eLr = (l-s)rM2"^(l+r )S-1/d (1+r)
(lib) esw = (wk/(wk+A)) - ((l-s)Mi-Swl-S/D)
The compensated cross-elasticities are computed from the
uncompensated cross-elasticities by taking account of the
income effect:
(12a) eLr^^^^ = eLr " ( rM2 ^(l+r)^ l/(i+r)D)
(12b) esw^^^^ = esw " (wk/(wk+A)) - (Mi'Swl-S/D)
The calculated values for these elasticities based on the
parameter estimates from this study are shown in Table 3. The
uncompensated elasticities show that leisure is nonresponsive
to changes in the interest rate while saving increases
rathersubstantially as the wage rate increases. A ten percent
increase in the wage rate causes a 7.94 percent increase in
20
Table 3
Estimated Cross-Elasticities of Leisure and Saving
Uncompensated Cross-Elasticities
:
eLr .002
esw .794
Compensated Cross-Elasticities:
eLr'^°"^ -.011
es„COMP
.515
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saving. The compensated elasticities likewise show a rather
small cross-substitution elasticity between leisure and the
interest rate but a fairly large cross-substitution elasticity
between saving and the wage rate.
Hence, this study finds that not only does an increase in
the wage rate tend to have a large compensated effect on
leisure, it also has a large compensated cross-effect on
saving. Conversely, an increase in the interest rate has a
small compensated effect on saving and a relatively small
compensated effect on leisure. The implications of these
findings for taxation are discussed below.
IV. Implications for Taxation
A major finding of this study is the discovery of
relatively large compensated own- and cross-wage elasticities
and relatively small (near zero) compensated own- and cross-
interest rate elasticities. This finding has important
implications for the deadweight loss of the personal income
tax. By reducing the disposable wage and interest rates, the
personal income tax distorts economic behavior, causing a loss
in efficiency. The efficiency loss associated with a
distortionary tax is defined as the deadweight loss (or excess
burden) of the tax.
The concept of consumer surplus is often used for
calculating the deadweight loss of a tax. In general.
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deadweight loss per dollar of tax revenue (sometimes called the
efficiency loss ratio) is measured by:
COMP(11) Deadweight Loss/Tax Revenue = 1/2 t e
where t is the marginal tax rate.^ The deadweight loss per
dollar of tax revenue varies proportionally with the marginal
tax rate and with the compensated elasticity of demand.
The personal income tax reduces both the disposable wage
rate and the disposable interest rate, creating two sources of
deadweight loss. The estimated compensated own- and cross-wage
and interest rate elasticities can be used to calculate an
estimate of the deadweight loss of the income tax.^ The
estimates from this study indicate that the loss per dollar of
wage tax revenue is .177 (.5 x .248 x 1.424) and the loss per
dollar of interest tax revenue is .001 (.5 x .248 x .011). The
government could have collected $1.18, with exactly the same
effect on consumer utility, had it used a lump-sum tax. It
also implies that the deadweight loss from taxing wages is much
greater than the deadweight loss from taxing interest. The
government could reduce the deadweight loss of the personal
income tax by reducing the tax on wages and increasing the tax
on interest.
The above results must be viewed with caution since they
are based on the assumption that the compensated demand curves
are linear (or that the tax change is small enough that linear
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approximation are acceptable). Since we are calculating a
deadweight loss associated with a .248 marginal tax rate, the
estimated deadweight losses may be biased.
V. Conclusions
This paper presents an empirical model of labor supply and
saving that allows for cross-substitution between the two
activities. Estimates of the own- and cross-substitution wage
and interest elasticities suggest that both work and saving
behavior are much more responsive to changes in the wage rate
than to changes in the interest rate. If this is correct, then
wage taxation is likely to create larger efficiency costs than
is interest taxation. Since these results are based on a
highly simplified model, they must be viewed with caution.
In the model, saving is defined as a residual between
major consumption items and income, and the interest rate is
imputed on the basis of state of residence. In reality, there
are many vehicles for saving, each with its own interest rate,
and each taxed at a different tax rate. As several authors
have pointed out, it is an oversimplification to speak of "the"
interest rate elasticity of savings when, in fact, there are a
wide range of elasticities.^
Another simplification of the model is its focus on the
labor supply response of the head of household. Several
studies have shown that female labor supply is likely to be
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more sensitive to tax changes than is male labor supply. An
important extension of the model would be to include the labor
supply responses of secondary family workers. Likewise, the
model could be extended to consider different aspects of labor
supply such as job choice and human capital investment.
The motivation behind these simplifications was to make
the model empirically tractable. Research of the long-run
effects of taxation is still in an early stage of development.
Better cross-section data sets on savings and interest rates
and more realistic models of family work and saving behavior
are sorely needed.
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FOOTNOTES
1. For a comprehensive analysis of recent literature on taxation
and labor supply, the reader is referred to Killingsworth (1983),
and for a review of recent work in the area of savings and
taxation, see Kotlikoff (1984).
2. eLw = ( 9L/ 9w)(w/L) and esr = ( ^ S/ 8 r)(r/S).
3. Bank Administration Institute, U.S. Bank Performance Profile
,
Report No. 1203.
4. McLure (1980) discusses this issue.
5. Stiglitz (1988) pp. 446-449.
6. ew^OWP = enw^^^^ + egw^^^^ = .909 + .515 = 1.424 and
e^COMP
= enr^O^^ + egr^^^^ = .033 - .022 = .011.
7. See for example Kotlikoff (1984), p. 1594, and Rosen (1988),
p. 405.
8. Rosen (1980), p. 171.


